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JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-2-2(3)(a),
has jurisdiction to review a decision of the Utah Court of
Appeals•
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1•

Whether the Court errored by according greater weight to

Defendants/Respondents affidavits than Plaintiffs/Appellants
affidavit when inference indulges that when considering motions
for summary judgment it is not appropriate for the Court to weigh
the evidence or assess credibility, W.M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio
Natural Resources Co-, 627 P.2d 56 (Utah 1981).
2.

Whether the Court errored by failing to review, " . . .

inferences to be drawn from the facts . . . in a light most
favorable to the Appellants.

Webster v. Sill, 675 P. 2d 1170,

1172 (Utah 1983) thereby ruling that Plaintiffs/Appellants did
not established the requisite causal link between the treatment,
or lack of, provided by Defendants'/Respondents' to cause the
death of the minor child.

Godeskv v. Provo City Corp., 690 P.2d

541 (Utah 1984)
3.

Did the Court of Appeals improperly rule on the lack of

proximate cause when the lower court ruled on the issue of
proximate causation only from the perspective that intervening
events occurred superceding any misconduct on the part of the
defendants?

Watters v. Querrv, 588 P.2d 702 (Utah 1978).

The standard of review for this case is whether the court of
Appeals abused its discretion.
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellants filed a wrongful death complaint against

respondents Dr. Nickol, Dr. Okubo and Holy Cross Jordan Valley
Hospital alleging improper and negligent treatment, which
resulted in their infant child's death.
Respondents moved for summary judgment at the District Court
level and were granted summary judgment by an order dated,
January 27th, 1988.

(See Addendum A ) .

Appellants appealed the

order granting summary judgment dismissing their action for
wrongful death (medical malpractice) and the Court of Appeals
affirmed the lower court judgment on March 28th, 1990 because of
the lack of evidence.
II.

(See Addendum B ) .

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Plaintiffs' infant child, Tiffany, was born on June 30,

2.

Tiffany was taken to Holy Cross Jordan Valley Hospital

1984.

four days after her birth.

Two subsequent visits to Holy Cross

Jordan Valley Hospital occurred on July 16th, 1984 and August
16th, 1984 after she stopped breathing and was treated each time
by Dr. Nickol.
3.

Tiffany died December 20th, 1984 of sudden infant death

syndrome (SIDS).
4.

Tiffany was also treated by Dr. Okubo on July 16th,

5.

Dr. Nickol failed to properly refer the child to a

1984.

3

proper physician for issuance of a home apnea monitor or to
recommend its use, which could have prevented the infant child's
death.
6,

Dr. Okubo, likewise, failed to properly order the

appropriate treatment of the monitor,
7.

(See ADDENDUM D ) .

Holy Cross Jordan Valley Hospital employees failed to

properly record the previous visits and records and the symptoms
observed as well as to report these material facts to the
physicians.
III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Whether the Court of Appeals errored by according less
weight to Appellants affidavit.

All affidavits were sufficient

in form and substance; there was not reason whatsoever to have
accorded greater weight to Respondents affidavits than the one
presented by the Appellants.

By according greater weight to

Respondents affidavits, the Court weighed the evidence and
assessed credibility, rather than solely determine if there
existed a genuine issue of material fact which could be submitted
to the trier of fact thereby concluding that Dr. Jacobs'
affidavit was sufficient to defeat Respondents motions for
summary judgment.
The Court errored by not reviewing all affidavits in light
most favorable to the Appellants' because inference indulges that
greater weight should be accorded Appellants affidavit when
reviewing a motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiffs' supporting

affidavit clearly indicated that the issue of proximate cause was
4

sufficiently presented to create doubt as to Defendants duty to
follow the appropriate standard of care.

Dr. Jacobs' testifies

directly on the issue of proximate cause.

He also indicated how

the hospital failed to make proper records available to detail
previous hospital visits for Respondent physicians review.

Had

the Court view the Appellants' affidavit most favorable to them,
it could have reasonably concluded that a genuine issue of
material existed; and, his expert opinion was sufficient to
create doubt thereby raising a genuine issue in regard to
proximate cause.
It was error to have ruled that intervening events occurred
superceding any misconduct on the part of the Respondents because
no assertions of intervening events occurring, which disturbed
the causal nexus described by Dr. Jacobs, were submitted by
Respondents.

Respondents failed to act in accordance to the

appropriate standard of care by not admitting Tiffany to inhospital observation or ordering the use of the home monitor.
Therefore, their original omitted acts does not relieve them from
liability.
ARGUMENTS
POINT I
I.

WHETHER RESPONDENTS AFFIDAVIT WAS ACCORDED GREATER
WEIGHT THAN APPELLANTS
Dr. Obuko has previously asserted that Dr. Jacobs' affidavit

"makes only a conclusory allegation of proximate causation
without specific facts or competent proof."
makes such an assertion.

Dr. Nickol also

However, Okubo and Nickol error because
5

Dr. Jacobs' affidavit is sufficient, in form and substance, to
raise a genuine issue of fact, precluding summary judgment, as
discussed herein.
In considering a motion for summary judgment, "it is not
appropriate for a court to weigh the evidence or assess
credibility; the sole initial inquiry is whether there is a
genuine issue of material fact. W.M» Barnes Co. v. Sohio Natural
Resources Co., 627 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1981).

Furthermore, it

takes only one sworn statement to dispute the averments on the
other side of the controversy and create an issue for the trial
of fact to consider.

Id.; Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp, v. Clark, 755

P.2d 750, 752 (Utah App. 1988)."

(Quoting Reeves v. Geigy

Pharmaceutical. Inc., 764 P.2d 636 (Utah App. 1988).
Okubo has confused the requirements of affidavits for those
of lay persons with those of experts.

He cites as controlling

authority the rule, "[t]o raise a genuine issue of fact, an
affidavit must do more than reflect the affiant's opinions and
conclusions."

Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp., 29 Utah

2d 274, 508 P.2d 538 (1973); (quoting) Webster v. Sill 675 P.2d
1170, 1172 (Utah 1983).

In addition, "Rule 56(e) of the Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure provides that affidavits in support of
or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must set forth
such facts as would be admissable in evidence at trial."

Norton

v. Blackman, 669 P.2d 857 (1983); Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen
Bros Const., 731 P.2d 483, 485 (Utah 1986).

Appellants concede

that "an identical requirement is found in almost all
6

jurisdictions."
lay experts.
witness.

The standard Okubo relied on is appropriate for

However, Dr. Jacobs is testifying as an expert

Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence (URE), is the

applicable standard of review for affidavits submitted under Rule
56(e) (URCP), which provides:
"Rule 702. Testimony by experts.
If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill/ experience
and training, or education, may testify thereto in the
form of an opinion." (Emphasis added).
Because Dr. Jacobs' is testifying as an expert, Appellants assert
that American Concept Ins. Co. v. Lochhead, 751 P.2d 271 (Utah
1988), states the proper rule and is determinative in resolving
this issue.
To start, Respondent expert, Dr. Neilsen, in his affidavit
states, "although some physicians may choose to order a home
monitor for circumstances similar to what the plaintiffs reported
occurred on July 4, 1984, the standard of care would clearly not
have required Dr. Okubo to order one or refer the patient to
another physician who would do so."

(ADDENDUM C ) .

This expert

opinion was directly controverted by a sworn evidentiary
document, more specifically, Dr. Jacobs' affidavit.
In it, he states, while one could perhaps argue that such
care was not warranted following the 07/04/84 emergency visit, X
am of the opinion that such care was justified after the 07/16/84
pediatric check-up and/or the 08/16/84 and 10/01/84 emergency
room visits.

Drs. Okubo and Nichols had a duty to insure
7

necessary follow-up was carried out and failed to do so.

The

above, in my opinion, constitutes care below an accepted standard
(negligence) and was the proximate cause of the child's demise
from SIPS."

(ADDENDUM D) .

(Emphasis added).

directly on the issue of causation.

He testifies

Consequently, greater weight

should not have been accorded to Dr. Neilsen's or Dr. Pinell's
affidavit than Dr. Jacobs' because all medical doctors were
detennined to have the competence to form an opinion with respect
to the standard of care, or lack of care.

As stated in W.M.

Barnes Co., it is not appropriate for a court to weigh the
evidence or assess the credibility.

The fact is, Dr. Neilsen's

affidavit is conclusory.
Dr. Neilsen states, "in addition, even if Dr. Okubo had
ordered a home monitor there is insufficient data or literature
available to conclude with medical probability that it would have
prevented this particular infant's death."

In other words, there

exists insufficient data or literature to conclude with medical
certainty that it would not have prevented Tiffany's death.
Because medical probability is quite different than a legal
standard of proof and the affiant does not define exactly what
that standard is, it is not very helpful in determining causation
in the instant case.

In this case, "a genuine issue of material

fact exists [because] on the basis of the facts in the record,
reasonable minds [Dr. Okubo, Dr. Neilsen and Dr. Jacobs] differ
on whether defendant's conduct measures up to the standard."
Singleton v. Alexander, 19 Utah 2d 292, 431 P.2d 126 (1967): FMA
8

Acceptance Co. V. Leatherbv Insurance Co., Utah, 594 P.2d 1332
(1979).
All physicians were deemed competent, and "may testify
thereto in the form of opinion[s]M, Rule 702 (URE).

Because

there exists a sworn evidentiary document, "to dispute the
averments on the other side of the controversy,"

Lucky Seven

Rodeo Corp., supra, there exists a dispute of material fact as to
who may be responsible for Tiffany's death.

Because both Courts

weighed the evidence and assessed the credibility of all medical
doctors, the lower Courts errored by according greater weight to
Respondents affidavits rather than reviewing the affidavits in
the light most favorable to Appellants.

If looked at in the

light most favorable to Appellants, it is clear that Dr. Jacobs'
affidavit was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material
fact to be determined by the trier of fact.
Ins. Co.i supra.

American Concept

Thus, Respondents' motion for summary should be

reversed because, "a motion for summary judgment should be denied
where the evidence presents a genuine issue of material fact
which, if resolved in favor of the nonmoving party, would entitle
him to a judgment as a matter of law.

Utah R.Civ. P. 56(c);

Russell v. Park City Utah Corp,, 29 Utah 184, 506 P.2d 1274
(1973); University Club v. Invesco Holding Corp., 29 Utah 2d 1,
504 P.2d 29 (1972).
POINT II
II.

PROXIMATE CAUSE WAS SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED BY APPELLANTS
The Court of Appeals found that Plaintiffs' did not
9

establish the requisite causal link between the Defendants'
treatment and the infant child's death,

(See Addendum A, pp. 6

and 7). However, Plaintiffs' supporting affidavit clearly
indicated that the issue of proximate cause was sufficiently
presented by Dr. Jacobs to call into doubt Defendants' failure to
follow the standard of care, resulting in the death of the
parties minor child.

"The above, in my opinion, constitutes care

below an accepted standard (negligence) and was the proximate
cause of the child's demise from SIDS."

(Addendum D para. 13).

M

[T]estimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise

admissable in not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate
issue to be decided by the trier of fact.", Rule 704 URE; and,
"whether a defendant has breached the required standard of care
is a question of fact for the jury.

Jensen v. Dolen, 12 Utah 2d

404, 367 P.2d 191 (1962); FMA Acceptance Co., supra; Jackson v.
Dabney 645 P.2d 613 (Utah 1982).

Because Dr. Jacobs is a

competent expert witness, and his testimony would be admitted at
trial, pursuant to Rule 702 (URE), his expert opinion was
sufficient to establish proximate cause.
Dr. Jacobs also set forth how the hospital failed to
properly make records available to detail previous hospital
visits and how the two Respondent physicians should have required
the deceased to have been observed in the hospital and required
the use of a home apnea monitor.

(See ADDENDUM D).

Thus, the

proper legal cause of the demise of the infant was sufficiently
presented when looked at in the light most favorable to
10

Appellant.
Dr. Jacobs further specifies that the hospital nursing staff
and Dr. Nickol failed to detail the fact that actual apnea was
observed by the parents and that there was cyanosis.

Also

omitted was the fact that the child required stimulation such as
pinching or significant findings on exam to account for
respiratory compromise.

Factors such as inaccurate record

keeping by the hospital, an improper history taken by the staff,
as well as the unavailability of records during subsequent visits
to the hospital contributed directly to the failure to consider
SIDS susceptibility in the infant, which would have resulted in
the ordering of the home apnea monitor.

Dr. Jacobs testifies

that these material facts fell below the standard of care and
were directly attributable to the child's demise.

(See ADDENDUM

D).
Further, he explains that Dr. Okubo should have issued a
home apnea monitor after the 7-16-84 pediatric check-up and Dr.
Nickol should have arranged for a home apnea monitor.

Tiffany's

death, he states, would easily have been avoided if this
treatment would have been carried out, and the Respondents failed
in their duty to do so.

He then states that the Respondents'

above described negligence was the proximate cause of the child's
demise from SIDS.

(See Aff. of Dr. Jacob's paras. 9-13).

The general rule regarding proximate cause is:
"A proximate cause of an injury is a cause which
in direct unbroken sequence produces the injury. It is
one without which the injury would not have occurred.
The law does not necessarily recognize only one
11

proximate cause of an injury, consisting of only one
actor, one act, or the conduct of only one person. To
the contrary, the acts and omissions of two or more
persons may work concurrently as the efficient cause of
an injury, and in such a case, each of the
participating act or omissions is regarded in law as a
proximate cause and both may be held responsible."
(Empha sis added).
Godeskv v. Provo City, 690 P.2d 541, 545-546 (Utah 1984).
Therefore, Appellants did establish the requisite sufficient
enough to demonstrate proximate cause and have the issue
submitted to a trier of fact.
POINT III
III WHETHER THE LOWER COURTS IMPROPERLY RULED ON THE LACK OF
PROXIMATE CAUSE FROM THE PERSPECTIVE THAT INTERVENING
EVENTS OCCURRED SUPERCEDING ANY MISCONDUCT ON THE PART OF
RESPONDENTS
Okubo asserts, "defendant physician could not foresee the
negligence of the other physicians who subsequently treat the
plaintiff."
factor.

Apparently, this is offered as an intervening

Okubo reasons, "[i]n a medical malpractice action where

there are a number of possible cause for the plaintiff's injury,
a physician's negligence will be regarded as a proximate cause
only if the evidence is more likely or probable that his
negligence caused injury than the other possible causes.
(Emphasis added).

In Utah:

"Negligence is the failure to do what a reasonable
man [Okubo] and prudent person would have done under
the circumstances, or doing what such a person under
such circumstances would not have done. The fault may
be in acting or omitting to act [failure to recommend
in-hospital observation and failure to issue a home
apnea monitor]." (Emphasis added).
Meese v. Brigham Young University, 639 P.2d 720, 723 (Utah 1981).
12

Additionally, "proximate causation is generally a matter of fact
to be determined by the jury.

Godeskv, supra.

Okubo argues that Okubo could not have foreseen that Tiffany
would go to another physician whose negligence acts cause her
death.

The Trial Court in granting summary judgment for

Respondents ruled that the Respondents were not a proximate cause
of the infant's death inasmuch as there were intervening events
that superceded any misconduct on the part of the said
defendants.

(Addendum A, p. 2). As stated previously:

"The law does not necessarily recognize only one
proximate cause of an injury, consisting of only one
actor, one act, or the conduct of only one person. To
the contrary, the acts and omissions of two or more
persons may work concurrently as the efficient cause of
an injury, and in such a case, each of the
participating act or omissions is regarded in law as a
proximate cause and both may be held responsible."
(Empha sis added).
Godesky, supra.
The motions for summary judgment do not specify any
factual elements of any intervening events and there is nothing
in the record to give Plaintiffs cause to rebut any assertion of
superceding causes.

Nothing in Respondents responsive pleadings

or their affidavits suggest intervening events superceded any
misconduct, other than that attributed to the parents'
negligence, which was asserted in Respondents' answers, as being
greater than or equal to the negligence of defendants.

No

factual allegations were spelled out on the record to establish
an intervening and superseding cause, and no evidentiary hearings
were held before the court.

Rather, when asked at a deposition
13

if he knew of any negligence that may have occurred because of
the Butterfield parents' conduct, Dr. Nickol replied, "I would
say, no."

(Nickol depo. p. 48).

The record is devoid of any misconduct on Appellants' part
and no assertions were made during oral argument at the Trial
Court that any superceding causes existed.

Nevertheless:

"An intervening negligent act does not
automatically become a superseding cause that relieves
the original actor. The earlier actor is charged with
the foreseeable negligent act of others. Therefore, if
the intervening negligence is foreseeable, the earlier
negligent act is a concurring cause. '[T]his includes
situations where negligent of other wrongful conduct of
others should be reasonably anticipated.' Watters v.
Ouerry, Utah, 588 P.2d 702, 704 (1978) (Watters I).
See also Harris v. Utah Transit Authority, 671 P.2d at
219 ("[a] person's negligence is not superseded by the
negligence of another if the subsequent negligence of
another is foreseeable"); Prosser, Law of Torts 275
(4th ed. 1971) ."
Godeskv, supra, at 545.

Concurring negligent causes of death are

questions to be determined by the trier of fact.
For the Trial Court to have ruled that intervening events
occurred without that issue being placed before him by
evidentiary documentation was error and to have done so without
allowing rebuttal shifted the burden of proof and denied
Plaintiff's due process.

No assertions of intervening events

occurring which disturbed the causal nexus described by Dr.
Jacobs were submitted by Respondents.

So, "[u]nless the evidence

is free from doubt so that all reasonable men would come to the
same conclusion, negligence is a question of fact to be decided
by the jury.

Little America Refining Co. v. Leyba, 641 P.2d 112

(Utah 1982).

Also, "where doubt exists, a party should go to
14

trial."

Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d 170 (Utah 1983).

It should be noted that the only prerequisite needed to
reverse the trial court in Reeves, supra, was a sworn evidentiary
statement attributing the proximate cause of the harm complained
of to Defendants' negligence.

Dr. Jacobs sworn affidavit exists

to controvert Respondents medical experts opinions and attribute
the proximate cause directly to Respondents.
CONCLUSION
A close look at the supporting affidavit clearly indicates
that the issue of proximate cause was sufficiently presented by
Dr. Jacobs to indicate that Respondents failure to follow the
standard of care resulted in the death of the parties minor
child.

Respondents' affidavits should not have been given more

credibility when assessing the standard of care.
affidavit clearly controverts Respondents'.

Dr. Jacobs'

He clearly set forth

how the hospital had failed to properly make records available to
detail previous hospital visits and how the two respondent
physicians should have required the deceased to have been
observed in the hospital and required the use of a home apnea
monitor.

Thereforef the proper legal cause of the demise of the

infant was presented when looked at in the light most favorable
to Appellants and each of the Respondents should answer to the
trier of fact.

vi ^
Dated this

<^J

day of November, 1990.
David Grindstaff
Attorney for Petitioner
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP SALT LAKS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
••—oooOooo——
ALBERT JOHN AND ANGELA
BUTTERFIELD, as guardians
and parents of and on
behalf of TIFFANY RUTH
BUTTERFIELD,

ORDER AND SUMMARY JUDGMENTS

Plaintiffs,
-vsDAVID OKUBO, THOMAS NICKOL,
and HOLY CROSS JORDAN VALLEY
HOSPITAL, JOHN DOES 1-5,

Civil No.

C86-9250

Judge Richard Moffat

Defendants.
-oooOoooThe defendants David Okubo, Thoaas Nickol, and Holy
Cross Jordan Valley Hospital's Motions for summary judgment
having come up for hearing on December 23, 1987, and the
court having heard additional arguments on January 5, 1988*
and the court having reviewed the memoranda and affidavits
in this matter, and the court having found as followsi
1.

Plaintiffs have not established through competent

or qualified expert -testimony that defendants breached the
requisite standard of care required of them in the treatment
administered to the infant deceased plaintiff Tiffany Ruth
Butterfield.
2.

The defendant Holy Cross Jordan Valley Hospital

is not liable to plaintiffs as a matter of law inasmuch as
the hospital employees involved in this case cannot practice
medicine, and are not held to the standard required of the
individual practicing physicians.
3.

In addition, the alleged misconduct on the part

of all the respective defendants, David Okubo, Thomas Nickol
and the Holy Cross Jordan Valley Hospital, were not a proximate
cause of the infant plaintiff1s death inasmuch as there were
intervening events that superceded any misconduct on the
part of said defendants.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that the motions for summary judgment of David Okubo, Thomas
Nickol and Holy Cross Jordan Valley Hospital be and the same
are hereby granted and defendants are awarded a judgment
against plaintiffs, no cause of action, together with costs.

DATED this Iffiday

of

l^E^**4*^^T*T988.

IdLt

D i s t r i c t s Corfj^/tfqftgsT
HINDLEY
t H. DIXON
DIXI
-2CLERK
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ADDENDUM B

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo

FILED

Albert John Butterfield and
Angela Butterfield, on behalf
of Tiffany Ruth Butterfield,

* of m«.Court

OPINION
(For Publication)
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
Case No. 880347-CA

v.
David Okubo, Thomas Nickol,
and Holy Cross Jordan Valley
Hospital,
Defendant and Respondents.

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Richard H. Moffat
Attorneys: David L. Grindstaff, Salt Lake City, for the
Butterfields
R. Scott Williams, Salt Lake City, for Okubo
Gary D. Stott, Salt Lake City, for Nickol
David W. Slagle, Salt Lake City, for Holy Cross Jordan
Valley Hospital

Before Judges Davidson, Jackson, and Larson.1
LARSON, Judge:
Albert and Angela Butterfield appeal from a summary judgment
dismissing this action for wrongful death, which they allege to
be due to medical malpractice by the defendants* Because of a
lack of evidence in the record concerning proximate cause, we
affirm.
1. John Farr Larson, Senior Juvenile Judge, sitting by special
appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10) (Supp. 1989)

The Butterfields1 infant daughter Tiffany died at home on
December 20, 1984 of sudden infant death syndrome. She was
born June 30, 1984. On that day and again on July 16, 1984,
Tiffany was examined by Dr. David Okubo, a pediatrician. On
two occasions in July and August 1984, the Butterfields noted
apparent problems in Tiffany's breathing and took her to the
emergency room of Holy Cross Jordan Valley Hospital ("Holy
Cross")/ where she was examined and treated by Dr. Thomas
Nickol, an emergency room physician and general practitioner.
Thereafter, the Butterfields placed Tiffany exclusively in the
care and treatment of Dr. Monty McClellan, a family
practitioner. He examined Tiffany on five occasions in August
through mid-December, 1984.
Following his August 16, 1984 examination, Dr. Nickol
recommended close observation of Tiffany*s breathing with
attention to possible cyanosis or blue discoloration. However,
neither Drs. Nickol or Okubo nor Holy Cross referred the
Butterfields to a physician with more extensive expertise
specifically in infant breathing disorders. They also did not
recommend the use of home apnea monitoring equipment. The
record does not indicate what, if any, care or treatment was
provided by Dr. McClellan for Tiffany's breathing problems
during the last four months of her life.
After Tiffany's death, the Butterfields sued Drs. Nickol
and Okubo and Holy Cross (but not Dr. McClellan) for medical
malpractice, filing their complaint on December 15, 1986. On
August 25, 1987, the district court held a scheduling
conference, after which an order issued stating that "All
discovery must be completed, including the filing of
depositions!!,] by December 11, 1987." On December 11, 1987,
the Butterfields moved to extend the discovery deadline in
relation to Holy Cross, and on December 23, 1987, in relation
to Dr. Nickol. On December 10 and 11, 1987, the defendants
filed motions for summary judgment accompanied by affidavits
stating in essence that the defendants* treatment of Tiffany
had not fallen below the applicable standard of care and was
not the cause of her death. The court heard those motions on
December 23, 1987. The Butterfields had no expert testimony in
the record in their favor until the day before the summary
judgment hearing, when they filed an affidavit by Dr. H. Barry
Jacobs. They attempted service of the Jacobs affidavit on
opposing counsel that evening and/or the next day. The copy
intended for Dr. Nickolfs counsel was left with a security
guard employed at the office building at which counsel works,
and Dr. Okubofs counsel could not locate any served copy until
after the summary judgment hearing.

QQm>f7_r»E
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The trial court noted the apparent defects in service of
the Jacobs affidavit, and seems to have concluded that, with or
without the Jacobs affidavit, the Butterfields had failed to
establish a prima facie case because no competent expert
testimony indicated either a breach of the standard of care or
that the defendants* medical treatment proximately caused the
child*s death. The principal2 issues presented are therefore
(1) whether the Jacobs affidavit is entitled to consideration
in ruling on the motion, and (2) whether there is sufficient
evidence in the record to create a factual issue about whether
the defendants both breached the standard of care applicable to
each and thereby proximately caused Tiffany's death.
Service of the Jacobs Affidavit
As courts have often noted, a party opposing a motion for
summary judgment that is supported by affidavits and/or other
evidentiary materials "may not rest upon the mere allegations
or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
. • . otherwise . . . must set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered
against him."3 in this case, therefore, the Butterfields had

2. The Butterfields also argue that the district court should
have granted their motion to extend the time limit for
completion of discovery. However, we find no abuse of
discretion in the trial court#s scheduling of the case. See
Utah R. Civ. P. 16(b); 3 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice
If 16.22 at 16-123 (2d ed.1989). Moreover, since the case was
properly dismissed on summary judgment, additional time for
discovery would serve no purpose. The Butterfields were not
entitled to delay the summary judgment because they failed to
proceed under Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f). £ss Cox v. Winters. 678
P.2d 311, 314 (Utah 1984); Reeves v. Geiov Pharmaceutical,
InCt, 764 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Downtown Athletic
Club v. Horman. 740 P.2d 275, 278-79 (Utah Ct. 1987).
3. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e); Busch Corn, v. State Farm Fire &
Casualty CQ,., 743 P.2d 1217 (Utah 1987); Franklin Fin, v. New
gmpUe D<?v. COt, 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983).
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to introduce evidence supporting those elements4 of their
case that had been effectively challenged by the defendants in
moving for summary judgment. A major part of the Butterfields'
evidence was the Jacobs affidavit.
The defendants argue that the Jacobs affidavit should not
be considered because it was not properly served on their
counsel. Axiomatically, an affidavit in opposition to a motion
for summary judgment must not merely be filed with the court;
it must also be served on opposing counsel no later than the
day before the hearing on the motion,5 to allow them an
opportunity to prepare for the hearing. We have previously
noted that an affidavit that has not been properly served
should not be considered, and the motion may be resolved
without it. P & B Land, Inc. v. Klunoervik, 751 P.2d 274, 277
(Utah App. 1988).
In this case, however, the facts relating to the lack of
service were not suitably established. The Jacobs affidavit
was accompanied by a certificate attesting to proper service.
The only evidence to the contrary in the record is the unsworn
verbal representations of counsel about the defects in service,
representations based in part on hearsay conversations with
their office personnel. While we have no reason to question
the accuracy of counsels representations, the Jacobs affidavit
was nevertheless the principal feature of the Butterfields1
opposition to the potentially dispositive motions for summary
judgment. The certificate of service is entitled to be taken
at face value, unless admissible evidence shows it to be
erroneous. The representations of counsel, though entirely
credible as far as they go, are nevertheless not evidence, and
therefore do not suffice to establish facts showing fatal
deficiencies in the service of the Jacobs affidavit. We
therefore consider the Jacobs affidavit in determining whether
the Butterfields came forward with sufficient evidence to
warrant denial of summary judgment.
4.
Briefly, to recover for medical malpractice, the plaintiff
must show that he or she suffered an injury that was actually
and proximately caused by an act or omission of thia medical
professional that fell below the standard of care for that
professionals medical field or specialty. See Robinson v.
Intermountain Health Care, Inc..
740 P.2d 262 (Utah App. 1987);
Hoopiiana v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 740 P.2d 270 (Utah
App. 1987).
5.

Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).

A

Standard of Care
Due to the technical and complex nature of a medical
doctor*s services/ expert medical testimony must ordinarily6
be presented in order to establish the standard of care by
which the doctor's conduct is to be measured and that the
injury was proximately caused by conduct of the doctor that
fell below that standard of care. Anderson v, Nixon. 104 Utah
262, 139 P.2d 216, 220 (1943); Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d
817, 821-22 (Utah App. 1988); Martin v. Mott, 744 P.2d 337, 338
(Utah App- 1987); Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care. I n c .
740 P.2d 262, 264 (Utah App. 1987). Further, the expert
testimony, like the standard of care which is its subject
matter, is specific to the particular medical specialty or area
of expertise of the defendant. In other words, one physician
is not qualified to give an admissible opinion on the treatment
provided by another physician, unless the physician giving the
opinion is shown to have familiarity with the treating
physician*s particular area of practice.7
The expert affidavits submitted by the defendants in
moving for summary judgment indicate both that the attesting
expert was qualified to render an opinion on the standard of
care applicable to the particular defendant about which he was
speaking, and that the defendant's treatment of Tiffany did not
fall below that standard. The question thus becomes whether
Dr. Jacobs also indicated familiarity with the standards of

6.
An exception is made where the physician*s error is so
plain and simple that it is within the range of ordinary lay
knowledge. For example, in Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348 (Utah
1980), a surgeon left a surgical cutting needle inside the
plaintiff's body, and the court held that expert testimony on
the standard of care was not needed, in essence because
everybody knows that a surgeon should not leave inside a sharp,
foreign object used to make the incision. In this case,
however, whether the defendants should have taken additional
steps to prevent future apnea is a factual question not within
the range of ordinary lay knowledge.
7. Burton v. Younoblnnry 711 P.2d 245, 247-48 (Utah 1985); see
Siaa Cfraflwjgk, 763 P,2d at 822.
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care applicable to the defendants sufficient to warrant
consideration of his opinion. In that regard/ Dr. Jacobs
stated:
1. I am a physician licensed in the State
of Maryland and am a Board Certified Surgeon
since 1974. I have past experience in
Emergency Room care at four hospitals, and
Pediatrics, having cared for patients in
private practice and hospitals, including
the Children's Hospital in Washington, D.C.
•

• • •

3. I am familiar with the Standard of Care#
applicable in 1984, required in pediatrics
and emergency room medicine, as well as
hospital responsibility for adequate record
keeping and availability of previous records
during later follow up care for a related
complaint.
Based on those statements, there is reason to question whether
Dr. Jacobs' apparently rather eclectic background qualifies him
as an expert in all three of the defendants1 fields of medical
practice. However, our role is not to cross-examine the
affidavit by conjecture;8 rather, we take it at face value,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Butterfields, since they lost the summary judgment motions in
the court below.9 In that light, Dr. Jacobs9 representations
of his competence are not so patently unfounded or conclusory
that they can be wholly disregarded. Because Dr. Jacobs1
opinion concerning the standard of care contradicts those of
the defendants* experts, it demonstrates the existence of a
dispute of material fact, which precludes summary judgment on
the question of the standard of care.
Proximate Causation
However, while Dr. Jacobs* criticizes the defendants*
treatment of Tiffany, he does not establish the requisite
*T SfiS EfiSYaa, 764 P.2d at 639 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) ("In
considering a motion for summary judgment, it is not appropriate
for a court to weigh the evidence or assess credibilityt. ]) **
9. Branham v. Provo School Dist., 780 P.2d 810 (Utah 1989);
Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State. 779 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah
1989); Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat*l Bank. 737 P.2d 225, 299 (Utah
1987) .

causal link between that treatment and Tiffany1s death. Dr.
Jacobs opines that the defendants' failure to prescribe home
monitoring of Tiffany*s breathing, and perhaps also a more
generalized inattention to Tiffany's breathing problems,
constitute treatment falling below the standard of care.
However, those asserted errors occurred in mid-1984, whereas
Tiffany died on December 19, 1984, four months after she had
been placed in the care of another medical practitioner. The
defendants argue that these facts, along with expert opinion,
indicate that their treatment of Tiffany did not proximately
cause her death. Dr. Jacobs, however, ignores the causation
question.
The element of proximate causation in a tort case inquires
into whether the defendant could, under the circumstances,
reasonably have foreseen that the harm of which the plaintiff
complains would result from the defendant's breach of the
standard of care. Sfifi Jackson v. Hicks, 738 P.2d 1037, 1039

(Utah 1987); Mitchell v, Pearson Snterst, I n c 697 p.2d 240,
245-47 (Utah 1985); Williams v. Melbv, 699 P.2d 723, 728-29
(Utah 1985). Without proof of proximate cause, the plaintiff
cannot recover in tort. Powell Div. of Dow Chemical U.S.A. v.
Del-Rio Drilling Programs. Inc., 761 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Utah

1988); Bennion Vt t*e<5rgnfl Johnson Constd Cow 701 P.2d 1078,
1082-83 (Utah 1985).
When proximate causation was called into question by the
defendants in moving for summary judgment, it was incumbent on
the Butterfields to come forward with evidence of a causal link
between the purported malpractice and the harm for which they
seek damages.10 However, there is nothing in the Jacobs
affidavit to indicate that the defendants* medical treatment
proximately caused Tiffany-s death, or even caused her death at
all. From the record, we cannot exclude the possibility that
the defendants may have erred, but fortuitously, their error
was not a cause, or a substantial enough cause, of Tiffany's
death.li The allegation of causation, a critical element of
the Butterfields* prima facie case, thus remains
unsubstantiated.

10. flyqt v, Hurst, 125 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 24 (1990).
!!•

Cf. Reeves. 764 P.2d at 642 (Utah App. 1988).
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Conclusion
We conclude that the Jacobs affidavit was before the
court, absent evidence indicating that it was not properly
served. That affidavit, though conclusory, nevertheless
introduces enough apparently competent expert testimony to
create a factual dispute on the question whether the
defendants' treatment of Tiffany Butterfield fell below the
applicable standards of care* However, even viewing the facts
in the light most favorable to the Butterfields, there is a
dearth of evidence in the record to counter the defendants'
assertions that their treatment of Tiffany did not proximately
cause her death*
We therefore affirm the district court's order of
dismissal.

IAJ&CLJ.

Richard C. Davidson, Judge

n,

Norraafa H. J a c k s o n , ^ u d g e
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ADDENDDM C

R. Scott Williams, #3498
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendant Okubo

BY

Wl

Sixth Floor Boston Building

~

DEPUTY CLERK

#9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
——oooOooo
ALBERT JOHN AND ANGELA
BUTTERFIELD, as guardians
and parents of and on
behalf of TIFFANY RUTH
BUTTERFIELD,

AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS W.
NIELSON, M.D., PH.D.

Plaintiffs,
-vs-

Civil No.

DAVID OKUBO, THOMAS NICHOL,
and HOLY CROSS JORDAN VALLEY
HOSPITAL, JOHN DOES 1-5,

C86-9250

Judge Richard Moffatt

Defendants.
oooOooo
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
County of Salt Lake )
Dennis W. Nielson, M.D., Ph.D., being first duly sworn
on oath deposes and states:
1.

I am a physician licensed to practice in the State

of Utah, having a specialty in pediatric medicine.

I am

a board certified pediatrician and-am presently an assistant
professor of pediatrics at the Department of Pediatrics at
the University of Utah Medical Center.

Of particular interest

oooos:
CiO

to this case involving a claimed sudden infant death syndrome,
I am board certified in pediatric pulmonology a*%d am presently
the director of the Pediatric Pulmonary Function Laboratory
at the University of Utah Hospital and Primary Children's
Medical Center.

I am also a member of the Sudden Infant

Death Advisory Council of the Utah State Department of Health.
A complete summary of my expertise and qualifications is
included within the attached Curriculum Vitae to this affidavit.
2.

At the request of counsel for Dr. David Okubo, I

have reviewed the medical records of the deceased infant,
Tiffany Ruth Butterfield, and the depositions of Albert John
and Angela Butterfield.
3.

That I am familiar with the standard of care required

of a pediatrician for treatment of the symptoms as reported
to Dr. Nickol and Dr. Okubo by the plaintiffs on July 4,
and July 16, 1984.
4.

That after a thorough review of the medical records

and the depositions involved in this case I am of the opinion
that Dr. Okubo did not deviata from the standard of care
required of him in the treatment rendered to the deceased
infant through July 16, 1984.
5.

More specifically, even if Dr. Okubo was told by

Mrs. Butterfield of the incident that allegedly occurred
on July 4, 1984, and that was referred to in her deposition,
I am still of the opinion that Dr. Okubo would not have been
-2-

00005G

GARY D. STOTT (A3130)
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & KELSON
Attorneys for Defendant Dr. Thomas Nickol
CSB Tower, Suite 700
50 S. Main St.
P.O. Box 2465
Salt Lake City, UT 84110
Telephone: (801) 531-1777
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ALBERT JOHN and ANGELA
BUTTERFIELD,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
DAVID OKUBO, M.D., et al.,
Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF

]
1
1

AFFIDAVIT OF
MICHAEL C. PINELL, M.D.

1

Civil No. C86-9250

I

Judge Richard Moffatt

)

ffdUjuk-

)

Michael C. Pinell, M.D., being first duly sworn upon his
oath, deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am a physician duly licensed to practice medicine in

the State of Utah, and am board certified with the American Board of
Family Practice, Fellow American Academy of Family Practice,
American Board of Emergency Medicine and Fellow American College of
Emergency Physicians.
2.

My education and training are outlined in my

Curriculum Vitae, attached as Exhibit "A".
3.

I have been involved in the practice of medicine as an

emergency room physician in the State of Utah during the time in

question in the Complaint of Mr. and Mrs. John Butterfield.

I am

familiar with the standard of care required of adequately-trained
emergency medicine physicians in Salt Lake City, State of Utah
during that time.
4.

The opinions set forth in this Affidavit are baaed on

my review of the medical records of Tiffany Butterfield from:
a.

Dr. Kenneth 0. Hunter;

b.

Dr. David Okubo;

c.

Holy Cross Jordan Valley Hospital
1)

Inpatient record dated 6/4/84 and,

2)

Emergency room records dated 7/4/84
and 8/16/84;

d.
5.

The State Medical Examiner.

Based upon my review of the medical records listed

above, and based on my expertise as an emergency medicine physician,
it is my opinion that the medical care rendered by Or, Thomas
Nickol to Tiffany Butterfield on July 4, 1984 and August 16,
1984, was performed within the accepted standard of care required of
physicians specializing in emergency medicine.
DATED this

3-H

day Of

S^yt^jy'-r

, 1987.

rv\p

MICHAEL C. PINELL, M.D.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO/before me th,is
1987.

My Commission Expires:
BUTTERF2/R0SE

-2-
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ADDENDUM D

IN THE THIRD JUDICAL DISTRICT COURT OP SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OP UTAH

ALBERT JOHN AND ANGELA
BUTTERFIELD, as guardians
and parents of and on
behalf of TIFFANY RUTH
BUTTERFIELD,

1
:
*

Plaintiffs,
-vs-

AFFIDAVIT OF H. BARRY
JACOBS, M.D.

:
tlVll NO.

DAVID OKUBO, THOMAS NICHOL,
and HOLY CROSS JORDAN VALLEY
HOSPITAL, JOHN DOES 1-5,

tB&-3^30

Judge Richard Moffatt

Defendants.

STATE OP UTAH
County of Salt Lake

)
:
)

ss.

H. Barry Jacobs, M.D., being first duly sworn on oath
deposes and states:
1. I am a physician licensed in the State of Maryland
and am a Board Certified Surgeon since 1974. I have past
experience in Emergency Room care at four hospitals, and
Pediatrics, having cared for patients in private practice and
hospitals, including the Children's Hospital in Washington, D.C.
2. I have reviewed the emergency room and pediatric
records of the Decedent, Tiffiany R. Butterfield, as well as the
depositions of her Parents, Albert and Angela Butterfield, and
have met with Albert Butterfield.
3. I am familiar with the Standard of Care, applicable
in 1984, required in pediatrics and emergency room medicine, as
well as hospital responsibility for adequate record keeping and
availability of previous records during later follow up care for
a related complaint.
4. After a thorough review of the available data I am of
the opinion that care below an acceptable standard was provided
to Tiffany Butterfield by Dr. Nichol, Dr. Okubo, and the Holy
Cross Jordan Valley Hospial with the specifics related below.

5. Assuming the facts as related in the parent's
depositions to be true, the history of present illness and/or
chief complaints gathered by the hospital nursing staff and Dr.
Nichols on 07/04/84 fail to detail the fact that actual apnea was
observed by the parents and there was cyanosis. Also omitted was
the fact that the child required stimulation such as pinching or
shaking before respiration was resumed. Given the lack of
significant findings on exam to account for respiratory
compromise and/or the apparent concern and anxiety of the
parents, such an omission contributed directly to the failure f»
consider SIDS in a differential diagnosis.
6. When the child was taken as directed for pediatric
evaluation on 07/16/84 by Dr. Okubo a vague reference was made
concerning the fact that the child did have unexplained
respiratory problems. Once again, an inadequate history lead to
an incomplete assessment and second failure to consider the need
to rule out SIDS as an etiological possibility.
7. The second emergency room visit of 08/16/84 did
contain a somewhat unclear reference to periods of apnea not
associated with cyanosis. This is refuted by the parent's
deposition in that the child had been observed to have cyanosis
with the apnea and once again required stimulation while being
transported to the hospital that did resolve the cynosis.
8. it is alleged that the prior emergency room record of
07/04/84 could not be obtained. Such data* should have been
available. This would have reinforced the fact that unexplained
respiratory problems existed and a differential diagnosis
including SIDS should have been developed.
9. The physical exam as recorded by Dr. Nichols on
08/16/84 failed to note any cardiac findings. The discharge
instructions did imply some need for monitoring the infant and
that the child should be re-evaluated by the Pediatrician. The
child's pa-rents insist they did not receive any follow-up
recommendations and therefore were unaware of the need for
10. There are no records available to detail what was
recorded during a third emergency room visit on or about
10/01/84. • The parent1s deposition indicates the child again had
an apneic episode and required stimulation. The deposition goes
on to insist that a concern about SIDS was raised and discounted
by Dr. Nichols as a possibility even though no other etiology had
surfaced to explain the child1s problems or account for the
degree of parental concern and/or anxiety.
11. On 12/19/84 Tiffany Butterfield did indeed die from
SIDS. This would easily have been avoided to a reasonable degree
of medical certainty by either in-hospital observation and
monitoring for apnea- followed by the issuance of a home apnea
monitor, or simply arranging for a home apnea monitor.

12. While one could perhaps argue that such care was not
warrented following the 07/04/84 emergency visit, I am of the
opinion that such care was justified after the 07/16/84 pediatric
check-up and/or the 08/16/84 and 10/01/84 emergency room visits.
Drs. Okubo and Nichols and a duty to insure necessary follow-up
was carried out and failed to do so.
13. The above, in my opinion, constitutes care below an
accepted standard (negligence) and was the proximate cause of the
child1s demise from SIDS.
Further affiant saith naught.
DATED this3j_ day of December, 1987.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this • 2 ] ^ day of
December, 1987.

Notary Public - Residing atx
Faye Arasim
Reston, VA
My Commission Expires:
My Commission Expires May 18.1&§

